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Executive Summary 
The changing nature of armed conflict has resulted in increased need 
to safeguard civilians, including humanitarian personnel, which is re-
flected in the emerging protection of civilians agenda. This report 
considers to what extent the issues raised in the recently updated 
OCHA Aide Memoire reflect the security needs of aid workers on the 
ground, by examining the case of Darfur.  
 
By performing a within-case analysis, this study portrays the humani-
tarian workers’ own perspective of the micro-dynamics of security in 
Darfur. It argues that the principles of humanitarian action, such as 
neutrality, impartiality and independence, provide protection and are 
pivotal for humanitarian security. However, these principles do not 
protect against all threats and need to be supplemented by other 
strategies such as protective walls, unarmed guards, barbed wire and 
security training.  
 
On the other hand, relying too heavily on such measures may diminish 
security as aid workers are alienated from the local population. This is 
because proximity to the population is perceived as the most important 
measure for security. On the backdrop of these findings, the Aide 
Memoire should focus more on the principles of humanitarian action. 
In cases where UN peacekeepers are not perceived as neutral, such as 
Darfur, UN forces should focus more on area protection rather than 
protecting humanitarian convoys. In addition, the Aide Memoire 
should stress the importance of mandatory security training for all aid 
workers, and should outline more clearly the repercussions for host 
governments that deliberately fail to ensure unimpeded humanitarian 
access. 

1. Introduction  
In recent years the United Nations (UN) has increasingly addressed 
protection of civilians (PoC) on the ground in its peace operations. 
One aspect of this process has been the development of an Aide 
Memoire by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Af-
fairs (OCHA). The Memoire can be described as a set of guidelines 
meant to assist parties in how to handle the PoC concept both when 
planning peacekeeping operations and when in the field. As such it 
does not only address issues pertaining to the conflict-affected popula-
tion, it also recognizes the need for increased protection of humanitar-
ian personnel on the ground. This report examines how well the rec-
ommendations presented in the third edition of the Aide Memoire re-
flect the protection needs of aid workers in the field by looking at one 
specific case, Darfur.  
 
The human suffering caused by the conflict in Darfur has resulted in a 
humanitarian initiative previously unprecedented and potentially the 
largest UN peacekeeping operation in the world. However, the work-
ing conditions for aid personnel in Darfur have not been unproblem-
atic, many humanitarian workers have been attacked and several have 
been killed. As a result, questions arise as to how aid workers can 
achieve higher levels of security and protection. 
  
Traditionally humanitarian agencies have located security and protec-
tion in the principles of humanitarian action, such as neutrality, impar-
tiality, and independence. These principles, intended to guide the con-
duct of aid organizations, have their roots in the emergence of the hu-
manitarian system and has served to provide relief agencies with safe 
passage and security in conflict environments. However, voices are 
arguing that after the Cold War and even more so post 9/11 the new 
world order has complicated the work of humanitarian actors by mak-
ing it more political and ambiguous. This in turn has diminished aid 
agencies’ ability to protect themselves behind the principles of hu-
manitarian action, the argument holds. 1 
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Finding the discussion in the literature often overly theoretical and not 
often enough informed by the practice in the field, one of the aims of 
the present report has been to explore the micro-dynamics and prac-
tices of security on the ground. By performing interviews with hu-
manitarian personnel themselves, adopting an exploratory approach, 
this project has sought to depict their perception of these principles 
and their connections to security and protection issues. On the basis of 
these interviews, this report argues that neutrality, impartiality and in-
dependence are still the main elements of humanitarian staff’s secu-
rity. Consequently, the OCHA Aide Memoire should pay more atten-
tion to these principles by fostering and promoting the neutrality and 
independence of aid agencies. This can be achieved by distinguishing 
more clearly between civil and military procedures and responsibili-
ties; and by UN peacekeepers focusing more on area security rather 
than openly protecting individual aid agencies as UN peacekeepers are 
not perceived as neutral. Furthermore, this report argues the Aide 
Memoire should highlight the need for mandatory security training for 
all aid personnel working in conflict environments, such training 
would greatly benefit the security situation of humanitarian workers in 
the field and would increase their ability to protect themselves.  
 
2. Protection of Civilians: An overview 
In the last decade protection has received greater attention by scholars 
and the international community. This is reflected in the emergence of 
the ‘protection of civilians’ agenda. As the civilian casualties in war 
have risen dramatically and civilians have become the main target of 
war, there has developed a stronger ‘culture of protection’ than prior 
to the 1990s. Although civilian protection has concerned the interna-
tional community for decades, it was not until 13 April 1998 when the 
UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan, mentioned ‘protection of civilians’ 
in his article that the term began its institutional history (UNSG 1998). 
Since then the concept has gained a foothold in international relations, 
as there was a felt need to incorporate more strongly the protection of 
non-combatants in UN peacekeeping (Lie & de Carvalho 2010). The 
result was the adoption of four UN Security Council (UNSC) resolu-
tions which centred on the need to ensure protection and safety for 
civilians, including humanitarian personnel in order for them to be 
able to deliver aid (Ibid.). OCHA played a vital role in the develop-
ment of the PoC concept emphasising the importance of humanitarian 
access and safety and security issues (OCHA 2004). In March 2002, 
the UNSC adopted the first Aide Memoire developed by OCHA, in 
order to facilitate the consideration of PoC issues in its planning of 
mandates for peacekeeping operations. The Memoire is a framework 
to assist in identifying threats that arise to the protection of civilians in 
country situations (OCHA 2008). In January 2009, the UNSC passed 
the updated third edition of the Aide Memoire for the Consideration of 
Issues Pertaining to the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict 
(UNSC 2009).  
 
This report addresses only one segment of this Aide Memoire, namely 
“Humanitarian Access and Safety and Security of Humanitarian 
Workers”. In short, the main components of this section stress the 
need for all parties to adhere to international humanitarian law and 
human rights law, and to report to the UNSC on steps to improve pro-
tection. It condemns all attacks on humanitarian workers and calls 
upon UN peacekeeping missions to provide protection and facilitate 
humanitarian access. As stated in the Memoire, it is not meant as a 
blueprint for action, but rather as set guidelines on how to handle pro-
tection issues in the field. As such, the statements provided in the Aide 
Memoire do not present concrete measurements to facilitate protec-
tion. In fact, the language is vague, intended to suit all war-type sce-
narios and conflict situations. For example, the Memoire advice all 
actors to take appropriate steps to ensure protection and security, but 
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there is no mention of what such steps ought to entail. Furthermore, 
even though the Memoire condemns all breaches of international and 
human rights law and calls for an end to impunity, there are still no 
consequences for actors that commit the crimes. This in turn increases 
the notion that the language and ideas presented in the memoire are 
unclear.  
 
Despite the vague language and lack of specific suggestions on how to 
improve security for humanitarian workers and civilians in the field, 
the Memoire is an important document that puts protection of civilians 
on the international political agenda. It is a vital step in the right direc-
tion as protection and security of aid workers in the field has receive 
little attention to date. This report aims at making a small contribution 
to this knowledge gap by comparing research data retrieved from in-
terviews with the humanitarian community, with the resolutions of the 
Aide Memoire concerning the protection of humanitarian personnel.  
 
But what is actually meant by the term ‘protection of civilians’? Lie 
and de Carvalho (2010) point out that even though the security, devel-
opment and humanitarian segments of the international community 
have all adopted the PoC concept, there is a lack of consensus about 
what is meant by it in practise. The blue helmets of the African Union-
United Nations Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) are supposed to 
provide protection for civilians including humanitarian personnel, this 
is their mandate. However, it is argued that PoC poses a paradox for 
the humanitarian community, because most non-governmental organi-
zations (NGOs) embrace the idea that the concept should be a priority 
of all factions of the international community, but on the other hand, 
they have a fear that other actors providing protection might under-
mine their perceived neutrality, impartiality and independence (Lie & 
de Carvalho 2010). This raises a dilemma as such principles are 
deemed to be the foundation of humanitarian security in the field.  
3. The Principles of Humanitarian  
Action 
Traditionally humanitarian actors and their personnel have sought pro-
tection from the principles of humanitarian action. These principles, 
such as neutrality, impartiality and independence, are intended to 
guide the activities of humanitarian organizations. They offer aid 
agencies a trademark that represents a distinct form of intervention, 
one intended to purely relieve suffering and protect life in conflict. 
These principles have their roots in the emergence of the international 
humanitarian system at the end of the nineteenth century. Although 
the first Geneva Convention of 1864 does not explicitly mention 
‘principles’, the ideas of impartial distribution of aid and neutral status 
for medical installations are presented (Leader 1998: 293). The Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), founded in 1864, has 
been the beacon of humanitarianism and the vanguard in the develop-
ment of the principles of humanitarian action. Jean Pictet, perhaps the 
most important individual in the development of the principles, de-
fined them as: “a rule, based upon judgement and experience, which is 
adopted by a community to guide its conduct” (Pictet 1979: 135). The 
ICRC has a unique role as the custodian of the Geneva Convention of 
1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977, and has pushed govern-
ments to adopt the rules of war (Weiss 2006: 2). Its prominence in the 
humanitarian system can be seen by the decision of the Criminal 
Court of Justice to equate the word humanitarianism with the work of 
the ICRC rather than defining the term, and by the fact that the agency 
has won four Nobel Peace Prizes (Weiss 2006: 1-2).  
 
The evolution of the principles of humanitarian action resulted in the 
formal adaptation of seven fundamental principles by the Red Cross 
Movement in 1965, which have not changed since then (Leader 1998: 
294). These principles are: humanity, impartiality, neutrality, inde-
pendence, voluntary service, unity and universality (ICRC 1996). 
However, it was not until the 1980s that NGOs and the UN began to 
pay serious attention to the development of principles, and since then 
they have drawn heavily on the work of the Red Cross (Leader 1998: 
293). This report focuses on neutrality, impartiality and independence 
as they are viewed as the most important in terms of security.  
 
Karoline R. Eckroth 10 
3.1 Defining Neutrality, Impartiality and Independence 
The principles of humanitarian action are defined here in accordance 
with the definitions provided by the founding actor, the ICRC. The 
meaning of neutrality proclaimed by the ICRC, is that humanitarian 
workers and agencies “may not take sides in hostilities or engage at 
any time in controversies of a political, racial or ideological nature” 
(ICRC 1996: 7). In other words, humanitarian personnel must remain 
neutral in relation to both the military and to ideology. The second 
principle, impartiality, signifies that aid must be distributed on a needs 
basis without discriminating on the base of “nationality, race, religious 
beliefs, class or political opinions” (ICRC 1996: 4-5). Finally, the 
principle of independence represents the need for humanitarian or-
ganizations to maintain their autonomy and not be subject to govern-
ment control, so as to uphold the fundamental principles of neutrality 
and impartiality (ICRC 1996: 9-10).  
 
It is important to note that the exact meaning of the principles, espe-
cially neutrality and impartiality, has been a source of misunderstand-
ing between the ICRC and other humanitarian actors (Ku & Brun 
2003: 59). This may be due to the fact that the elements of neutrality 
and impartiality, such as code of conduct and constitutional element, 
might vary significantly (Ibid.). For instance, some humanitarian 
agencies may choose to vigorously denounce breaches of human 
rights and even call for military intervention, while others, such as the 
ICRC, would abstain from such assertions (Ibid.). These differences 
portray the increasingly diverse approaches of the humanitarian sys-
tem in the late twentieth century. Generally, there has become a basic 
divide between humanitarian organizations and academics who con-
tinue to uphold the principles of neutrality, impartiality and independ-
ence, and those who emphasize and side with selected victims, pub-
licly confront hostile governments, and advocate public policies of 
donor states (Hoffman & Weiss 2006: 84-85). What is clear, however, 
is that as civilians are increasingly the targets of war, those who come 
to their assistance are less likely of being perceived as neutral (Martin 
1999: 4).  
3.2 Acceptance, Protection and Deterrence 
Across the world, including Darfur, aid workers are more at risk, both 
expatriates as well as national staff. Increasingly news headlines are 
reporting incidents where humanitarian staff has been beaten, robbed, 
taken hostage, raped, or even murdered. Although statistics and 
documentation regarding fatalities among aid workers are incomplete, 
many studies suggest the number is increasing. One study, reviewing 
UN humanitarian personnel killed during the 1990s, concludes a dis-
concerting upsurge in people killed. From 1992 to 2000, 198 UN ci-
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vilian workers were killed, and in 1998 alone more civilian personnel 
were killed than military peacekeepers (Hoffman & Weiss 2006: 111; 
Schreier & Caparini 2005: 81). The rise in number of deaths among 
aid workers has become even worse in resent wars, such as Afghani-
stan and Iraq. The six most dangerous contexts for aid workers in 
terms of security are Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Iraq, North Caucasus, Somalia and Sudan (Stoddard et al. 2006: 1). 
 
The literature argues that there are many reasons for why there is an 
increase in attacks against humanitarian workers. These include: in-
crease in the number and duration of conflicts; more intrastate conflict 
than interstate; aid agencies are perceived as ‘soft’ targets that can be 
attacked with impunity; that there is a loss of neutrality among aid 
agencies; and that there is a culture of competition between humani-
tarian NGOs which enhances the pressure to get to a conflict zone first 
and work closer to the lines of confrontation (Hoffman & Weiss 2006; 
Marin 1999; Fast, forthcoming). 
 
As a result of increased attacks on aid workers, humanitarian agencies 
have been forced to take other measures to protect their security be-
sides relying on the principles of humanitarian action. It has become 
more common for humanitarian NGOs to take precautions by using 
protection and deterrence tactics. This trend can be summarized in 
what has come to be known as the ‘Security Triangle’ paradigm. Until 
after the Cold War humanitarian organizations relied mostly on accep-
tance to ensure their security. However, incidents like the massacre of 
six ICRC personnel in Chechnya in December 1996, demonstrated 
that passive acceptance was no longer sufficient to provide security 
for aid workers (Avant 2007: 148). This led a small group of people 
within the humanitarian community to modify the acceptance ap-
proach. They developed what has been named the ‘security triangle’. 
This approach centres on what is required by the mission and has its 
focus on the acceptance strategy, but in addition there is an emphasis 
on protection and deterrence (Van Brabant 2000: 11-14).  
 
Acceptance refers to when the community in which humanitarian 
agencies are working supports and accept their presence, and out of 
that acceptance grows security (Martin 1999: 5). What is meant by 
protection is the equipment needed to provide security, such as walky-
talkies, barbed wire and helmets; operational policies and procedures, 
such as curfews, training and clear policies on vehicle operations and 
finances; and coordinated operations, such as coordination and coop-
eration with the UN (Ibid.; ECHO 2004: 10-11). Finally, deterrence 
signifies posing a counter threat, and involves such measures as utiliz-
ing guards and coordination of activities with external international 
military forces in peacekeeping missions (Martin 1999: 6). The latter 
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is the least common form of deterrence, but has been employed in 
Iraq, Bosnia and Somalia. Acceptance strategies are favoured by most 
humanitarian NGOs, as it offers them a way to connect with the local 
people without taking sides in a conflict. 
 
 
4. Comparing Issues Raised in the 
Aide Memoire to the Needs in the 
Field 
Since the end of the Cold War a new form of military humanitarian-
ism has been surfacing. New UN policies of peacemaking, peacekeep-
ing and peace-building strategies saw the increased deployment of UN 
military forces in complex emergencies (Slim 1995: 112). These so- 
called integrated missions have become a favoured response by the 
UN to complex emergencies that concurrently calls on the political, 
military, humanitarian and developmental sides of the UN system 
(Eide et.al. 2005: 10). Although there is no universal agreement of 
what constitutes an integrated mission, the aims of such operations are 
to restore stability, law and order, protect civilians, and provide the 
foundations for long-term recovery, development and democratic gov-
ernance (Eide et al. 2005: 12). Such goals are not easily reconciled 
with the principles of humanitarian action, and have caused parts of 
the humanitarian community to raise concerns about the infringement 
of neutrality, impartiality and independence. They argue that given the 
political leadership of integrated missions, such operations will inevi-
tably end up prioritizing the political goals of the mission, even when 
this contrasts humanitarian concerns for saving lives (Eiden et al. 
2005: 14). Another side of this argument is that by working side-by-
side with the political and military factions of these missions, humani-
tarian actors runs the risk of being identified with these non-neutral 
components (Eide et al. 2005: 14). Consequently, aid personnel be-
come “soft targets for enemies of the mission, and their operations are 
undermined by the resulting security concerns” (Ibid.). In other words, 
the deployment of UN peacekeepers to protect humanitarian staff 
might cause a blurring of the lines between security and humanitarian 
segments of a mission, resulting in relief agencies loss of perceived 
independence and neutrality (Lie & de Carvalho 2010).  
4.1 The Security Situation on the Ground -- The micro-
dynamics of security 
When researching one specific case, in this instance Darfur, it be-
comes quite clear that the micro-dynamics on the ground are impor-
tant in terms of security. Security is not static; it changes constantly 
and rapidly, maybe even from one minute to the next. Consequently, 
there can never be any guarantees that security incidents will not oc-
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cur in a conflict context (Lægreid 2009 [interview]). The security si-
tuation for aid workers in Darfur has changed dramatically over the 
past six years, and continues to change to this day. Political decisions, 
misunderstandings, and competence of humanitarian staff all affect 
the security situation on the ground and has the potential to improve or 
deteriorate it. This is reflected by the arrest warrant issued for Presi-
dent al-Bashir by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in March 
2009, which has deteriorated the security situation for humanitarian 
workers in Sudan as a whole.  
 
Statistics on security incidents involving humanitarian workers in Dar-
fur in 2008 are worrying. They reveal an unpredictable and insecure 
environment. In 2008, 277 humanitarian vehicles were carjacked, 
there were 192 break inns or armed assaults on humanitarian prem-
ises, 218 humanitarian personnel were temporarily kidnapped in rela-
tion to the carjacking, and 11 people were killed (UN Humanitarian 
Official 2009 [Telephone interview]). Whilst the security situation has 
improved slightly for the internally displaced people in recent months, 
it has grown even worse for the aid personnel working in Darfur (Dan-
ChurchAid 2009). This can be seen as a direct result of the arrest war-
rant issued for President al-Bashir by the ICC. Following the warrant 
thirteen humanitarian organizations have been expelled from Sudan,1 
these NGOs employed 40 percent of all humanitarian staff working in 
Darfur (Human Rights Watch 2009). The expulsion has affected the 
health-aid sector the most, and has resulted in increased precautions 
and less movement on behalf of the remaining organizations. Security 
has also become more time consuming for humanitarian actors still in 
Darfur as attacks seems to become more targeted (Jepsen 2009 [inter-
view]). This in turn limits the time spent on aid distribution. 
 
According to a OCHA Humanitarian Official (2009 [Telephone inter-
view]) stationed in Darfur, the area can be seen as one of the worst 
environments in the world in terms of the security of humanitarian 
operations. This is not because of specific targeting of aid workers, he 
elaborates, but because of banditry of assets (see also Flint & de Waal 
2008: 188). Apart from the related abductions, the target for attacks 
has always been assets such as vehicles or communication equipment 
for the purpose of financial gain. Most killings of aid personnel have 
happened during such carjacking (UN Humanitarian Official 2009 
[Telephone interview]). However, there is a new trend in 2009 that 
has not been seen previously in Darfur, and that is the kidnapping of 
aid workers for the sake of abduction itself (UN Humanitarian Official 
2009 [Telephone interview]). Such actions are believed to be a direct 
                                                 
1   The agencies expelled are: NRC, MSF Holland, MSF France, CARE, Save the Children 
UK, Save the Children US, IRC, Oxfam, Mercy Groups, Action Contre la Faim, Soli-
darites, Corporate Housing Fundation International, and PADCO. 
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result of negative propaganda of humanitarian organizations by the 
government in Sudanese media, which has taken place after the arrest 
warrant was issued (Ibid.). Such publications greatly affect the per-
ceived neutrality of aid actors and therefore have severe consequences 
for their security 
  
Security micro-dynamics, described as localized factors and happen-
ings that affect the situation on the ground, can often not be attributed 
to global trends. They can only be recognized by looking at specific 
operations, but are extremely important for the security of humanitar-
ian personnel on a case to case basis. As Adam Combs (2009 [inter-
view]), Norwegian Refugee Council’s (NRC) Program Coordinator 
for Somalia and Sudan explains:  
 
Security situations vary from place to place. In Somalia, for instance, the 
security situation is very different for humanitarian workers compared to 
Darfur. Although they are both incredibly difficult, in Somalia aid per-
sonnel are targeted and international staff is at great risk of being kid-
napped. Thus, different strategies are applied here than in Darfur. It is ex-
tremely important to understand the context you are working in, which 
changes daily and can change quickly. Non-understanding of the conflict 
in which you are working is the biggest threat to security. 
 
There seems to be an overall agreement between the interviewees that 
it is vital to stay flexible in terms of security, so as to adapt to new 
risks and be able to react to them. Without doing so the humanitarian 
organization and its workers may not be prepared when new situations 
occur, thus making the security situation worse than what it could 
have been. This is to some extent what happened to Save the Children 
UK in 2004. As noted by one of the interviewees, this humanitarian 
organization had been working in Darfur for about twenty years. It 
had several developmental projects on different locations throughout 
Darfur. However, when the war commenced in 2004 the organization 
did not adjust into a war-type setting, which had severe consequences 
for their personnel’s security. Save the Children UK’s projects were 
implemented mainly by national staff, some of whom had high posi-
tions in Khartoum. When the war exploded these nationals were tar-
geted and some were killed, eventually forcing the organization to pull 
out of Darfur completely.  
 
The security context has continued to change during the course of the 
conflict. In the early stages, it was easier to identify the different 
groupings or parties of the conflict, and thus easier to predict levels of 
security (Lægreid 2009 [interview]). However, in recent years the 
groupings have been increasingly fragmented thus making it ex-
tremely difficult to tell who is who and predict what motives they 
have. In addition, the map of which areas are perceived as perilous in 
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terms of security has varied greatly in Darfur. In 2005 the situation 
was more stable than in later years. It was easier to pinpoint on the 
map where incidents had occurred and were likely to occur in the fu-
ture. In 2006, however, this became more difficult as the political and 
military situation was continuously changing (Lægreid 2009 [inter-
view]). Tony Marchant (2009 [interview]), an Emergency Coordinator 
for Médecins sans Frontières (MSF), worked in Darfur on two differ-
ent occasions, first in 2004 and then again in early 2007. He says he 
found it interesting how much the security situation had changed when 
he was there the last time. In 2004, the main security threat was the 
fighting between different groups and wide scale bombings. During 
his last visit, this was no longer the case. Instead, banditry had become 
the main concern. There was, and continues to be, an increased lack of 
control of various elements and groups of people who are targeting 
humanitarian agencies to steal their vehicles and equipment (Ibid.).  
 
This changing security landscape makes it difficult to have an all-
encompassing Aide Memoire that addresses every security scenario. 
When the security situation changes dramatically, there might be a 
need for different security measures. OCHA, for example, based on 
the relative stability of 2005 planned its operations for 2006 based on 
a stable scenario. This decision turned out to be wrong, and conse-
quently OCHA decided to plan for unstableness in 2007, which meant 
they had to change their security strategies (Lægreid 2009 [inter-
view]). The result was focusing more on access, negotiations, and se-
curity analysis, and on how to have a more flexible humanitarian re-
sponse to minimize risk (Ibid.). However, does the changing micro-
dynamics of security affect the reliance on the principles of humani-
tarian action by aid agencies?  
4.2 Neutrality 
As mentioned in the introduction, most of the informants for this study 
believe the principles of humanitarian action are the main pillar for 
humanitarian personnel security. The occurring securitization of aid 
visible in other complex emergencies like Afghanistan and Iraq (Fran-
gonikolopoulos 2005: 58-59; Harmer 2003: 529; Shannon 2009: 18), 
seems to be less apparent in the Darfur context. Although tactics may 
change according to which threats are more predominant, the underly-
ing principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence seem to 
guide actions of aid agencies in Darfur, at least in theory. Turid 
Lægreid (2009 [interview]), the former Head of OCHA’s sub-office in 
North Darfur, believes “the more difficult the situation is the more 
important are the principles of humanitarian action. Without uphold-
ing these principles the situation would have been even worse”.  
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As illustrated above, banditry is the main security problem for aid 
agencies in Darfur today. In terms of neutrality strategies this is a 
problem, because banditry affects everyone whether you are perceived 
to be neutral, impartial, and independent or not. Thus, it may be ques-
tioned how these principles can be the foundation for security in the 
Darfur context. On the other hand, it may also be, although difficult to 
prove, that for the very reason these principles are applied by the hu-
manitarian organizations to ensure security, banditry is the only main 
threat. If aid agencies in Darfur would have openly taken sides and 
distributed aid partially, the security situation would most likely have 
been worse. This is because the organizations would then be perceived 
as part of the conflict itself and thus evident targets of attack by en-
emy groups.  
 
Evelyne Schmid (2009) argues that effective protection strategies 
should be developed by focusing on the reasons why civilians are de-
liberately attracted. In this case, we might say that the motivation be-
hind the banditry is desperate poverty. Thus, improved living condi-
tions for the Darfur people would increase protection. This, however, 
is the overall aim of the humanitarian agencies and the reason why 
they are there. Consequently, and as pointed out by Schmid herself, 
there might not always be “a system out there that can protect people 
in ongoing conflict” (Schmid 2009: 357). In addition, as stated by 
Adam Combs (2009 [interview]), the line between banditry and politi-
cal revolt are traditionally gray. Often governments in power will not 
admit they have an armed political opposition and will instead decide 
to call them bandits as it is less threatening to their powerbase (Ibid.). 
Because there are so many fragmented groups in Darfur, it is almost 
impossible at times to know who is behind the actions of banditry. 
Darfur is a complex political landscape and several of the interviewees 
admit they cannot be certain that there are no alterative motives be-
hind the carjacking and thefts. But most of the informants believe the-
se actions are committed by groups of people who have no jobs or in-
come and are desperate for money in order to survive.  
4.2.1 Identification 
If neutrality is one of the main elements to aid agencies’ security, wa-
ving their organization’s flag should ensure a great deal of protection. 
In the early stages of the conflict it was particularly important to mark 
cars with stickers and flags to show they were not part of the conflict 
but humanitarian vehicles. For example, Tony Marchant (2009 [inter-
view]), describes an incident in South Darfur:  
 
A team of MSF staff was driving along the road. On both sides of the 
road there were cornfields with crops that were quite high, so the land-
cruiser was not seen in the area. Consequently, the MSF team put an extra 
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flag on an extra rod so that the flag could be seen above the cornfields. 
Later, one of the commanders told them as they were going through a 
checkpoint that it was good they put up the extra flag because, as he said, 
“we nearly got you”.  
 
In such circumstances identification is still important in Darfur. How-
ever, because of banditry, marked vehicles are now increasingly be-
coming targets. As a result, some humanitarian agencies have resulted 
to new tactics by hiring local vehicles from different groups of people. 
These vehicles often belong to an important person in the area who 
rebels would not want to disrespect. Therefore, by driving around in 
his recognizable car the agencies would not be targeted (Marchant 
2009 [interview]). Consequently, choosing to have a high or a low 
profile depends on the situation and on how you are perceived as a 
humanitarian organization (Lægreid 2009 [interview]).  
4.2.2 Advocacy  
Advocacy may affect how a humanitarian organization is perceived by 
the parties in a conflict and by the international community. The rea-
son given for the expulsion of the thirteen humanitarian agencies by 
the Sudanese government was that it believed them to be spies for the 
ICC (BBC 2009). Although the organizations deny this, there might 
be some reasons why exactly those thirteen were expelled. First, they 
all chose to have a high profile in Darfur, making them well known 
and quite visible in the area. For example, the NRC received a great 
deal of attention when it was running the Internally Displaced Peoples 
(IDP) camp in Kalma in 2004, one of the biggest in Darfur. The situa-
tion in and around this IDP camp has been one of the main sources of 
conflict between humanitarian NGOs and the Sudanese government. 
As a counter measure to the increased pressure on NRC by the Suda-
nese government, the NGO received extensive support from the UN 
system, however, this turned out to be both a blessing and a curse 
(Lægreid 2009 [interview]). Second, they all worked directly with the 
local population and had a close relationship to victims, which may 
have led the government to fear the organizations were in possession 
of dangerous information or that they were taking sides with the vic-
tims. Finally, the advocacy against atrocities and human rights viola-
tions by some of the organizations may have been a deciding factor 
for expulsion by the government (Ibid.). As noted by Roger Håland 
(2009 [interview]), a nurse who has worked for MSF in Darfur:  
 
In addition to the principles of humanitarian action, MSF also has a prin-
ciple of being a witness to the atrocities that are being committed. This 
may sometimes hamper our security and might also affect to what extent 
we are wanted in a country or an area. It can lead to getting thrown out 
and it can lead to people questioning if we are spies. And if people have 
that perception of us it can quickly lead to deterioration in security for our 
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staff. Advocating may also affect our neutrality, because if we speak out 
against one party of a conflict because they are the ones committing the 
worst crimes against humanity they may see us as taking sides.  
4.2.3 Difference between International and National Staff 
In terms of security there are differences between international- and 
national recruited staff. The majority of security incidents involving 
humanitarian workers have affect national personnel rather than inter-
nationals. There are several reasons for this. First, the majority of aid 
workers in Darfur are Sudanese nationals, for Norwegian Church Aid 
(NCA) for instance there are seven expatriates compared to 250 na-
tional staff in the region (Thorsen 2009 [interview]). This, of course, 
increases the odds of national staff being attacked. Second, because so 
many people have been killed in Darfur it is seen as more ‘normal’ to 
kill a national Sudanese (Marchant 2009 [interview]). Third, the con-
flict in Darfur is to a certain extent characterized as an ethnic conflict 
between various tribal groups. As all national staff is from a tribe, they 
are in some ways partly involved in the conflict and may be seen as 
biased (UN Humanitarian Official 2009 [Telephone interview]). Fi-
nally, it is widely held that there will be more repercussions for the 
attacker if an international aid worker is wounded or killed than if the 
same happens to a national (Ibid.). 
 
As a result of these factors, international staff conveys some neutrality 
to the aid operations in Darfur. International personnel are not part of 
a tribe in Sudan and are therefore seen as more neutral in relation to 
the Darfur conflict (Horntvedt 2009 [interview]; Marchant 2009 [in-
terview]). Håland (2009 [interview]) explains that when driving from 
one location to another the convoy experienced more security when an 
international was present, as it increased the threshold for attack.  
 
Even though national staff are more at risk and is the group of hu-
manitarian workers who have suffered the most from security inci-
dents like rape and killings, they are also an important asset to hu-
manitarian operations in terms of security. Because national staff 
blends in with the local environment they are able to move more 
freely in some contexts than internationals (Lægreid 2009 [inter-
view]). Furthermore, they know the area well and are aware of politi-
cal dynamics that might not be obvious to an outsider. National staff 
usually also have access to vital security information that would not 
have been given to international personnel, such as the likelihood of 
an attack or crossfire between tribes along the rout chosen for a hu-
manitarian convoy (Marchant 2009 [interview]).  
 
Because Darfur is a landscape of fragmented groups that are some-
times in conflict with each other, and in terms of neutrality, an impar-
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tial recruiting of national staff from various tribes is important. With-
out doing so the organizations might be perceived as taking sides or as 
spies, which is what happened to the example of Save the Children 
UK mentioned above. In Tony Marchant’s (2009 [interview]) words: 
“with the amount of national staff we have, we were very much aware 
of that if they all came from the tribe Fur, which was often the case, 
we would run the risk of being perceived as taking sides with the Su-
dan Liberation Amy (SLA).”  
4.3 Impartiality 
Impartiality in terms of the distribution of aid is also imperative in 
terms of aid workers’ security. While impartial distribution of aid is 
based on need, giving aid to one groups while ignoring another may 
cause the ignored group to feel overlooked, believing the aid agency 
to favour the other group. Roger Håland (2009 [interview]) illustrates 
this problem:  
 
We were based in Kabkabiyah in North Darfur, which is a government 
held area, and also had another project in a village in the mountains out-
side Kabkabiyah. When driving from the town up to the mountains we 
experienced getting stopped by the nomads who lived in the area in be-
tween. They believed it unfair that we would drive up to the mountains to 
give aid without setting up a clinic for them as well. The reason for why 
we had not done so was that we had not identified any needs with these 
nomads, and thus did not see it as necessary to have a project there. How-
ever, we quickly realized that it was necessary to give some aid to this 
group for diplomatic reasons, and to make sure we were not attacked on 
our way up to the mountains.  
 
It is also important for humanitarian organizations to be transparent in 
how they perform their work as this builds trust. An example given by 
Tony Marchant (2009 [interview]) exemplifies this. He describes one 
time his MSF team was driving through a checkpoint in a rebel area to 
open a clinic there and was stopped by a commander who wanted to 
take their drugs and equipment. The team asked him what he would 
do of it was his wife who was ill, and after some tension they were 
allowed to continue. Later that day the same MSF team returned to the 
checkpoint carrying a pregnant woman who had to have a caesarean 
operation or else she would die. Such actions build trust, Marchant 
explains, because it shows the organization is actually performing the 
work it set out to do.  
4.4 Independence  
When discussing humanitarian agencies’ independence in the Darfur 
context, interviewees generally focused on NGOs relation to UN 
peacekeepers and to what extent they coordinate security with the UN. 
The Protection of Aid Workers 21 
This varies greatly from organization to organization, but in general 
NGOs have coordinated their security to a high degree in Darfur 
(Lægreid 2009 [interview]). The UN is a large organization with a 
well established network; therefore the organizations that choose to 
coordinate their security prefer to be informed of the security levels of 
the UN, and will often decide to follow these. For instance, if the UN 
decides to close a road for UN movement, the NGOs that coordinate 
security with the UN will be informed and subsequently decide 
whether they will follow the advice. In situations of evacuation of UN 
staff, the NGOs will usually be offered to be included, but will make 
their own decisions. Some organizations choose to partly coordinate 
their security with the United Nations. NRC, for example, is not 
against integrated missions per se and do coordinate with the UN to a 
great extent (Combs 2009 [interview]). However, as Adam Combs 
points out: “it is important to disengage from parties who have a po-
litical stake in the conflict, which is not always easy because everyone 
has a political stake one way or the other”. In addition, the United Na-
tions tend to amplify security levels compared to many NGOs, mean-
ing it perceives the situation as more severe than other humanitarian 
actors. This is viewed by many as unnecessary and as a disadvantage 
because it limits mobility and thus restricts the distribution of aid 
(Marchant 2009 [interview]; Thorsen 2009 [interview]).  
 
The UN system has a governance module where the Emergency Relief 
Coordinator, John Holms, has the mandate to coordinate humanitarian 
operations globally (Lægreid 2009 [interview]). In order to do this, the 
Interagency Standing Committee has been established in which the 
OCHA is the secretariat and UN organizations and several NGO net-
works participate (Ibid.). The ICRC also participates in this committee 
as an observer. This system is supposed to be implemented on the 
ground under the name Country Teams in order to coordinate security 
and humanitarian operations. Although it has taken time to engage the 
NGOs, it is now in the beginning phase of implementation (Lægreid 
2009 [interview]). Under this system OCHA offers to perform the im-
portant security task of lobbying and advocating on behalf of NGOs in 
towns that are seen as insecure (UN Humanitarian Official 2009 
[Telephone interview]). In such insecure places it is usually OCHA 
that will negotiate with the different parties to the conflict in order to 
set up night patrols, security hot lines and so on (Ibid.). Turid Lægreid 
(2009 [interview]) believes most humanitarian actors have seen the 
general humanitarian access negotiations as beneficial, but it varies 
whether the NGOs have preferred OCHA’s (and UNDSS) to negotiate 
access for their specific organization. Some see it as convenient that 
OCHA already is in dialogue with the respective parties and have an 
established network, while others prefer independent dialogue. The 
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choice depends on capacity as well as policies for independence and 
impartiality.  
 
However, there are humanitarian NGOs that wish to stay completely 
independent from the UN system and UNAMID for security and op-
erational reasons. These organizations agree with arguments posed by 
authors like Eide et al. (2005: 10-14) that working side-by-side with 
the political and military factions of these missions infringes their neu-
trality. The ICRC and MSF are entirely independent from the United 
Nations, and would never let anybody else negotiate access for them 
(Lægreid 2009 [interview]). Tony Marchant (2009 [interview]), for 
instance, described integrated missions as a “nightmare”, informing 
that MSF is against the whole system of the AU-UN hybrid mission 
and is probably the organization most vocal against it as well. He ar-
gues that although the UN wishes to be perceived as a neutral actor, it 
is not. The UN works to support Sudan’s government, which creates 
problems in terms of neutrality when the government is a big party in 
the conflict itself (Jepsen 2009 [interview]). Moreover, before 
UNAMID was established the African Union had troops patrolling the 
region, and many people did not see them as neutral. Now when the 
UN has taken over, the same troops are still in Darfur they have only 
exchanged their green helmet with a blue one (Marchant 2009 [inter-
view]). As a result, Marchant believes UNAMID hampers the security 
of humanitarian NGOs rather than improving it. He explains that MSF 
would never let UNAMID troops defend their agency or convoy, be-
cause it would be too dangerous as they have been attacked on many 
different occasions. Marchant (2009 [interview]) admits that MSF 
have on several instances become reliant on the UN system of air 
transport, because security levels on the ground made it too difficult to 
travel by vehicle. But travelling in UN helicopters is not risk free ei-
ther. As the mission becomes more and more integrated the military 
are also flying around in similar helicopters, consequently it has been 
shot at several times. The same problem relates to UN vehicles, be-
cause UN humanitarian groups drive around in white land-cruisers 
with UN written on them as does the UNAMID (Ibid.). This can easily 
be misunderstood by the local population.  
 
All the people interviewed for this project agree that UNAMID has 
had little if any positive effect on the security situation of humanitar-
ian organizations. A Humanitarian Official (2009 [Telephone inter-
view]) working for OCHA stated that UNAMID can only have a posi-
tive impact on the security situation of aid workers in Darfur as long 
as they are seen as relatively neutral. He points out that as of now 
UNAMID is quite new, little over one year, and that they are generally 
very well accepted, but that they should be very careful not to become 
a party of the conflict. The previous African Union Mission in Sudan 
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(AMIS) was perceived as taking side in the conflict by many. Partly 
because they negotiated the Darfur peace agreement which included 
some parties but not others (Ibid.). For this reason they were targeted 
and lost more than 20 people in 2007. As African Union was clearly 
seen as biased no humanitarian organization wanted to be affiliated 
with it (Ibid.). The UN Humanitarian Official believes the jury is still 
out when it comes to the new UNAMID, but that they are, as of now, 
fairly well accepted. They are working on a new peace agreement and 
if this is seen as biased by some people they may come into a more 
dangerous light themselves and that might, in turn, be hazardous for 
humanitarian workers (Ibid.). Consequently, most humanitarian or-
ganizations have chosen to stay far away from UNAMID thus far, 
only very few would accept an escort by UNAMID peacekeeping 
forces. What aid agencies do ask for is more area security, such as 
night patrols. UNAMID has a great deal of bases also in relatively re-
mote places in the desert. Just the presence of such bases may some-
times facilitate security, especially for UN humanitarian organiza-
tions, which would always choose to stay at the base and take advan-
tage of the security it offers (UN Humanitarian Official 2009 [Tele-
phone interview]).  
 
Thus, the Aide Memoire should focus more on the principles of hu-
manitarian action and peacekeeping forces’ ability to foster and up-
hold these. Perhaps rather than providing physical protection for hu-
manitarian personnel, peacekeepers should assist in the lines between 
civil and military operations are not blurred. Such a principled ap-
proach to the humanitarian community has worked for the Norwegian 
government. Norway’s policy attempts to separate humanitarian and 
political objectives in order to uphold the principles of neutrality, im-
partiality and independence (Solheim & Støre 2008: 9-11). In the 
words of an OECD (2008: 78) development assistance report on Nor-
way: “this principled, yet pragmatic, approach gives Norway consid-
erable credibility within the international community and bolsters its 
reputation as an influential actor within the international humanitarian 
system”.  
  
There is a cleavage between the academic literature and the view of 
humanitarian personnel. While the existing literature to a great extent 
argues aid agencies’ neutrality, impartiality and independence are di-
minishing due to the politicization and securitization of aid, the or-
ganizations themselves, though expressing concerns of these devel-
opments, still hold that these principles are the core of their structural 
foundation and of their security and protection. One may question if 
these humanitarian actors are upholding the principles out of their own 
interest rather than they actually being the groundwork of security. 
Authors like O’Brian (2004), Barnett (2005), and Belloni (2007) argue 
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that humanitarian action is and should be political and that aid agen-
cies should speak out against injustices of war and accept funding 
from belligerents. This argument holds that neutrality, impartiality and 
independence do not provide security as they are virtually non-
existent and merely exhortations. However, the humanitarian commu-
nity represented by the informants for this study disagrees with this 
assumption. They maintain that the worse the security situation is the 
more important these principles are. They argue that by taking side, or 
distributing aid partially, humanitarian workers are viewed as legiti-
mate targets of enemy groups as they become associated with the con-
flict itself. As demonstrated by the examples of security incidents 
above, the micro-dynamics on the ground in Darfur seems to confirm 
this assertion.  
 
5. The Security Triangle: Acceptance, 
Protection and Deterrence 
As mentioned above, the security triangle paradigm was developed by 
a group of individuals within the humanitarian community in response 
to new threats and security concerns. The strategies of the security tri-
angle do not necessarily conflict with neutrality, impartiality and in-
dependence. To a certain extent these strategies are utilized to enforce 
and inform about the principles of humanitarian action.  
5.1 Acceptance 
In correspondence with the existing literature (see Cockanye 2006; 
Krähenbühl 2004; Martin 1999), the interviewees for this study agree 
acceptance is still the main strategy employed by aid agencies to en-
sure security. In the words of an UN Humanitarian Official (2009 
[Telephone interview]): “the main way in which humanitarian organi-
zations seek protection is to create acceptance by the local community 
through neutrality, impartiality and independence.” Constant commu-
nication with the population is a vital security measure, and access is 
often negotiated through this dialogue (Ibid.). Adam Combs (2009 
[interview]) states that “you cannot work without acceptance, because 
without acceptance you have no access”. In order to maintain neutral-
ity and impartiality it is important to communicate with all main 
groups in a given area. In the case of Darfur this would entail negotiat-
ing with the Arab militia, the police, the local authorities, different 
rebel groups in opposition to the government, and the local population 
(Pettersen 2009 [interview]). In such negotiations acceptance and ac-
cess are often achieved by the aid agency informing about the princi-
ples of humanitarian action, what sort of aid the organization will pro-
vide, who they are, where they are working, and why they are there 
(Lægreid 2009 [interview]). This type of negotiations has been exe-
cuted fairly well in Darfur compared to other complex emergencies 
(Ibid.).  
 
Security and access are very closely related (Lægreid 2009 [inter-
view]). It is therefore essential to know who is in charge of an area so 
as to get security clearance from this group. By successfully commu-
nicating with the people in charge of a territory, they are able to assure 
the organization will not be attacked, and thus safe travel in that given 
area is to some extent ensured (Ibid.). There are of course no guaran-
tees that attacks or carjacking will not occur, but by making rebel 
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groups or the Arab militia promise their safe passage, humanitarian 
agencies have increased their level of security. Tony Marchant (2009 
[interview]) explains that when an organization has security clearance 
from the various groups in charge of an area but are still attacked, it 
often annoys the people who have given their green light because it 
may affect their respect and reputation.  
1 
Staying in touch with all groups in control of a region may be diffi-
cult. Turid Lægreid (2009 [interview]) explains that in North Darfur, 
the ICRC was better than OCHA in maintaining a dialogue with the 
Arab militia. OCHA’s contact was more sporadic and this was mostly 
because the Sudanese government did not want them to have a dia-
logue with the Arab militia. For instance, when OCHA went to have 
access negotiations with Musa Hilal,2 the Sudanese government often 
obstructed contact. Because of the ongoing process of the ICC, the 
government became nervous when OCHA was talking to Hilal, fear-
ing they were inquiring on behalf of the Court. This happened despite 
the agency, as the humanitarian part of the UN, had nothing to do with 
the ICC (Ibid.).  
5.1.1 Proximity to Population 
All of the informants interviewed for this study emphasized the sig-
nificance of maintaining a close relationship with the local population. 
This is supported by Krähenbühl (2004: 509) who argues that “the 
closer one is to populations at risk, the better-placed one is to analyse 
events and formulate strategies to address them”. Several of the inter-
viewees pointed out that this proximity, together with being clear 
about the work they perform, is the most important factor for humani-
tarian personnel security. Such ordinary activities as international hu-
manitarian staff drinking tea with the population in the local market 
may not seem to be a strategic action. However, in terms of security 
this is essential (Jepsen 2009 [interview]; Marchant 2009 [interview]). 
Walking around and talking to people on the streets shows that aid 
personnel are approachable and may debunk possible beliefs that they 
are spies or have alterative motives. On the other hand, having a close 
relationship with the population may also have negative effects for aid 
agencies. As previously discussed, proximity to the population might 
very well have been one of the main reasons for the expulsion of thir-
teen humanitarian organizations form Darfur in March this year.  
 
Martin (1999: 5) notes that in emergency operations, pressures to get 
the relief projects up and running may limit the time and ability to en-
                                                 
2  Musa Hilal is one of the major leaders of the Arab militia in Darfur. He has acknowledged 
his role in the recruitment of Janjaweed militias, and has been accused of initiating ethnic 
conflicts. 
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gage with the local community. However, this seems not to have been 
the case in Darfur, despite the extent of the humanitarian emergency, 
as the interviewees working for different humanitarian agencies all 
stated that this was highly prioritized in Darfur.  
5.2 Protection 
The main security equipments used by humanitarian actors in Darfur 
are: communication equipment, protected walls and gates, barbed 
wire, safe-rooms, and bomb-shelters. Which physical protection 
measures are employed depends on the local environment and may 
vary on a day-to-day basis, although communication equipment is al-
ways used by all humanitarian teams. This is because it is essential for 
these teams, who might be spread around a vast territory, to be able to 
contact their base (Horntvedt 2009 [interview]; Lægreid 2009 [inter-
view]); Marchant 2009 [interview]). If a humanitarian team is travel-
ling in an insecure area they are often ordered to report back to base 
every thirty minutes or so to make sure they are not harmed. If the 
team fails to do so, measures are set in motion to find out what has 
happened and to trace their location (Marchant 2009 [interview]).  
  
Protected walls, barbed wire, safe-rooms and bomb-shelters are used 
to shield humanitarian workers from criminals, bullets and bombs. It 
is always necessary to have a certain degree of physical protection in 
conflict environments (Pettersen 2009 [interview]). However, al-
though recognizing the need for such protective measures in certain 
contexts, some of the interviewees believed it to be important to limit 
this security strategy as much as possible. In Tony Marchant’s (2009 
[interview]) words:  
 
We have houses and compounds with big walls and barbed wire. But in 
the end how much protection does it give you? It gives you more protec-
tion to rely on the classical concepts of neutrality, impartiality and inde-
pendence, and that people know what you are doing. The way to achieve 
this is by being in proximity to the population, by talking to them, telling 
them why you are there, and by doing the work you said you would do 
[…] When you bunker up too much, suddenly people may start thinking: 
“what are they doing in there, maybe they are spies”.  
 
This argument has support in the literature that argues protection 
measures only provide a certain degree of protection as it does not 
confront the threat which is the main source of insecurity (Eguren 
2002: 14).  
5.2.1 Security Training 
There is a lack in the literature focusing on security training for hu-
manitarian personnel. Authors who do touch on the subject usually 
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mention that organizations vary to a great extent in their framework of 
and emphasis on security training of their staff (McCall & Salama 
1999; Moresky et.al. 2001; Van Brabant 1999). Insufficient security 
training is a recurring trend when looking at the interviews performed 
for this thesis. Although most of the agencies interviewed seem to of-
fer their staff a theoretical course before sending them to the field, se-
curity is only one part of it. Roger Håland (2009 [interview]), for in-
stance, admit he would have liked to have some practical security 
training before he went to Darfur. In his words: “It is not enough to 
have a good heart; you also need a good head on your shoulders to 
evaluate the situation and to understand the context you are in.” The 
security course that is given is often quite generic, lacking country-
specific security problems and measures. This instead is given in a 
document, a so-called country briefing, where there is one section on 
the current security situation in the designated country. Moreover, 
several of the informants admit that due to time restraints, sometimes 
aid workers are sent out without any training whatsoever. Instead, 
humanitarian organizations seem to base the security knowledge of 
their staff more on experience rather than training. Experienced staff 
is supposed to look after and guide their new colleagues. However, as 
Tony Marchant (2009 [interview]) has pointed out, such experienced 
personnel can sometimes be hard to come by.  
 
While the Aide Memoire notes that organizations personnel should 
receive training in international humanitarian law, human rights law 
and refugee law, it does not mention security training. By emphasizing 
that security training should be mandatory for all aid personnel, the 
Aide Memoire would highlight a specific task that would greatly in-
crease the protection of humanitarian workers in the field.  
 
The only organization that seems to have a sufficient training system 
for its staff before they are sent into the field is the ICRC. Newly re-
cruited workers for the ICRC first have to attend a beginner’s course 
consisting of nineteen hours of generic theory of working in the field. 
Of this course there is a significant section on security, and at the end 
of the course the new staff has to attend an exam (Parelius 2009 
[Telephone interview]). After passing this exam, new recruits partici-
pate in a second course with approximately the same duration, which 
focuses on preparing and performing international humanitarian work 
(Ibid.). In addition to this, new personnel attend a whole day devoted 
to security. This day consists of a theoretical part, but also has a prac-
tical segment in which personnel participate in simulation exercises of 
ambushes, carjacking etc. (Ibid.). Furthermore, the ICRC has specific 
security guidelines and strict security rules for its staff partly in order 
to protect and uphold the organization’s neutrality. If a humanitarian 
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worker of the ICRC breaks any of the rules or regulations they are 
sent home with no questions asked (Ibid.).  
 
Although the UN varies in its consistency with security training, it is 
increasingly improving (Lægreid 2009 [interview]). Taking after the 
ICRC module on training, UN international humanitarian staff has 
three different security segments they need to accomplish before de-
parting for Darfur. First, there are two different online training pro-
grams called ‘Basic Security in the Field’ and ‘Advanced Security in 
the Field’, which they need to pass (UN Humanitarian Official 2009 
[Telephone interview]). Second, there is a two-day practical training 
course in which humanitarian personnel participate in simulation ex-
ercises similar to the ones undertaken by ICRC staff (Ibid.).  
 
Although a minority of humanitarian organizations provides extensive 
security training before they send international aid workers to the 
field, some aid personnel receive training while they are there. RedR, 
an organization dedicated to training humanitarian staff, is offering aid 
agencies this service in Darfur (UN Humanitarian Official 2009 
[Telephone interview]). RedR is also committed to the principles of 
humanitarian action and view these as the founding pillars of their or-
ganization. This is in order to maintain the confidence of all parties 
and to be viewed as an impartial actor. However, there is another limi-
tation to the NGO, UN and RedR security training. The beneficiaries 
of the security training are disproportionately international personnel; 
despite the fact that national staff usually runs duty stations in the 
more insecure areas (Bolletino 2006: 9-10).  
 
RedR also provide security training courses in the host countries of 
western international humanitarian organizations. Elaine Jepsen (2009 
[interview]), a humanitarian worker for the International Organization 
for Migration (IOM), attended a five-day training course provided in 
her home country New Zealand before departing for Darfur. Although 
participating in the course was her own personal choice and on her 
own initiative, IOM paid for the training session. This course was 
provided by RedR in cooperation with the New Zealand army, and 
consisted of simulation exercises of various security scenarios. In Jep-
sen’s (2009 [interview]) words: 
 
The security course was incredibly helpful, and when I experienced a se-
curity incident in Darfur I realized just how useful it was to have run 
through simulations exercises beforehand. When a security incident oc-
curs you are obviously in a high risk situation, and being able to draw on 
things you have learned, such as if an attacker reacts in a certain way he 
is likely to do A, B. or C next, is extremely valuable. I was also quite sur-
prised of how directly what we learned in the exercises transferred into 
reality. 
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In addition, Jepsen points out that it is beneficial for international staff 
to receive such security training outside the conflict environment and 
before they are sent to the field. There are several reasons for this. 
First, receiving training before going to the field gives international 
humanitarian personnel time to digest and dwell on what they have 
learned. Second, such training functions as psychological preparation 
for the context humanitarian staff are about to work in, making them 
more aware of what to expect. Finally, it helps international humani-
tarian personnel decide if they would want to work in a conflict envi-
ronment and if they are able to handle tense security situations. In Jep-
sen’s (2009 [interview]) words: “When I did the training there were a 
couple of people who had quite strong reactions to the simulation ex-
ercises, so for them it was a good reality check as to where their 
threshold fell”. Practical security training in the form of simulation 
exercises should be mandatory for all humanitarian staff, including 
national staff, before they enter and start working in the field. Aid 
agencies should adopt such training into the organizational frame-
work. This would greatly benefit newly recruited aid workers and 
their ability to handle tense security situations in conflict areas and 
would increase their protection in the field. As pointed out by Van 
Brabant (1999: 7), there is a need for “agreed sector-wide standards 
that clarify the minimum requirements in terms of awareness, knowl-
edge and skill with regards to security issues for aid workers, and 
similar minimum requirements for organizations sending personnel to 
dangerous environments.”  
5.3 Deterrence 
Humanitarian organizations in Darfur do not employ armed guards for 
protection and deterrence. Rather they have unarmed guards that are 
more like watchmen by definition.3 These guards look after agencies’ 
compounds on a twenty-four hour basis, making sure unwanted people 
and criminals do not have access to the buildings. However, in cases 
of armed robbery or attacks, these guards are briefed not to stand in 
the attackers’ way and to give them what they want. There is no rea-
son to shoot back when objects and equipment, not human beings, are 
the targets of the attack (Marchant 2009 [interview]). Consequently, 
the informants for this project speak of the employment of guards in 
Darfur more as a protection strategy rather than a deterrent. There are, 
however, some instances in which armed guards have been used by 
humanitarian agencies in Darfur. Because movement from one loca-
tion to another is characterized as the most dangerous circumstances 
in Darfur, some agencies have utilized armed escorts (Lægreid 2009 
                                                 
3  Having watchmen is a general policy for humanitarian agencies throughout the world. 
Only in Somalia do all organizations have armed guards. This is because there is no work-
ing government in Somalia, they have no police, humanitarian staff is targeted, and the 
situation is too dangerous not to have a proper deterrent.  
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[interview]). Although such escorts are usually avoided as much as 
possible, NGOs like MSF and ICRC would never make use of them, 
some organizations resolve to the deterrent effect of this measure 
when the situation permits it. These escorts can be performed by 
UNAMID or by guards recruited from private security companies 
(PSCs) (Ibid.).  
 
As noted by several of the interviewees, it is extremely important that 
deterrence measures are not seen as a provocation as this may escalate 
violence. However, the very presence of guns may in some cases dete-
riorate the security situation. Roger Håland (2009 [interview]) admits, 
when driving through checkpoints, he would ponder whether young 
and armed teenage soldiers had the competence and maturity to know 
when to, or more importantly, when not to pull the trigger. Moreover, 
when both the guerrilla soldiers and humanitarian escorts have guns 
tensions may increase and cause a potential deadly situation. As noted 
by one of the interviewees, this is what happened in South Darfur 
when one of the managers of the Italian Corporation came to visit its 
humanitarian projects. The manager was travelling with his own 
armed bodyguards, and when they were stopped at a checkpoint ten-
sions increased and the bodyguards began shooting at some of the sol-
diers. It should be noted that such incidents are quite rare.  
5.3.1 Recruitment of Guards  
Guards or watchmen are usually recruited from the local population. 
As with the recruitment of national humanitarian staff, it is vital that 
this procedure is done in an impartial manner. There are few available 
jobs in Darfur, and because it pays quite well, these positions are quite 
sought after. Thus, if an organization recruit guards from one tribe 
only they will be perceived as biased, which may restrain their secu-
rity (Combs 2009 [interview]). In addition, some humanitarian agen-
cies recruit guards form PSC. For example, NRC has made use of lo-
cal private security companies when recruiting guards (Pettersen 2009 
[interview]). Glenn Pettersen, NRC’s Chief of Security, emphasizes 
that the NGO does not hire international PSCs as this is a disputed 
issue. However, he points out that in some contexts the need for pri-
vate security might be increasing.  
 
Humanitarian organizations do not recruit UNAMID soldiers to stand 
guard as this may infringe their neutrality and independence (UN Hu-
manitarian Official 2009 [Telephone interview]). However, in certain 
areas UNAMID has been requested to do additional patrols around 
humanitarian compounds, especially during night time, so as to pro-
vide an extra layer of security (Ibid.). This is also true for government 
Karoline R. Eckroth 32 
troops. Their presence in an area is seen as beneficial as they can be 
contacted directly if security incidents are to occur (Ibid.).  
5.4 Humanitarian Access Issues 
The three strategies of the security triangle are centred on the mission. 
However, in Darfur humanitarian actors have experienced obstacles 
by the Sudanese government in the implementation of their aid mis-
sions. Even before the arrest warrant for President al-Bashir was is-
sued by the ICC, humanitarian agencies experienced difficulties in 
relation to obtaining travel permits and visas. Although this is not di-
rectly linked to humanitarian staff’s security, it affects the mission on 
the ground and may have an indirect effect on the security situation. 
This is because travel restrictions and withdrawal of organizations due 
to orders by the government affects humanitarian actors’ proximity to 
the population which in turn may affect their acceptance. As indicated 
by Elaine Jepsen (2009 [interview]), the bureaucracy can be more of 
an impediment to humanitarian work than some of the security inci-
dents, and after the arrest warrant was issued there has been an in-
crease in national security checks and visa problems (Ibid.). In this 
regard, the Aide Memoire rightly highlights the responsibility of host 
governments to ensure security and protection of civilians in its terri-
tory, and to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance. How-
ever, the Memoire does not include specific measures to be imple-
mented if a state refuses to do so. It merely says that in circumstances 
where a state denies humanitarian access the UNSC “expresses its 
willingness to consider such information and, where necessary, to 
adopt appropriate steps” (UNSC 2009: 23).  
 
Turid Lægreid (2009 [interview]) point out that the obstructions by the 
Sudanese government were performed in a clever manner, making it 
difficult for humanitarian agencies to object. This obstruction of the 
delivery of aid by the government of Sudan has received a great deal 
of attention in the literature as well (Hagan 2006: 330; Ryle 2004: 2). 
Hugo Slim (2004: 812), for example states that there has been a mas-
sive obstruction of humanitarian access from the highest levels in 
Khartoum. For instance, the government would declare that they 
would like all humanitarian organization to establish projects in Dar-
fur, but that the laws of Sudan required them to apply for several per-
mits, so as to delay them as much as possible (Ibid.). Moreover, the 
Sudanese government would invent new laws and change the rules 
constantly, which made it difficult to start and close projects as there 
were increasingly new procedures that needed to be implemented by 
the aid agencies themselves (Ibid.).  
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The OCHA Aide Memoire calls upon host governments to resume re-
sponsibility in ensuring access and safety to humanitarian personnel. 
This is a vital point that greatly affects the protection and security of 
humanitarian organizations. However, as illustrated by the case of 
Darfur, this becomes difficult when the government itself is part of the 
conflict and expels and condemns aid agencies as part of their tactics.  
 
 

6. Conclusion  
As a result of the information analysed from the interviews and litera-
ture, this report argues neutrality, impartiality, and independence are 
still pivotal for the security and protection of aid workers. While the 
principles in themselves may not provide protection, how humanitar-
ian actors convey them through their proximity to the population, by 
performing their work in a transparent manner, and courteous individ-
ual behaviour affect how they are perceived and thus their security. 
These principles, however, are not sufficient to ensure security for aid 
personnel and need to be supplemented by protection strategies. Al-
though, relying too heavily on such measures may in turn diminish 
security as aid workers are alienated from the local population omit-
ting valuable security information. On the other hand, evidence found 
during the course of this research suggests proximity to the population 
may reduce security as well, especially in cases where the national 
government is a party to the conflict. This is because aid agencies that 
develop a close relationship with the local population may be viewed 
as taking their side, and thus faces risks of being expelled by the gov-
ernment.  
 
The OCHA’s Aide Memoire is vague in its language and lacks spe-
cific measures on how to improve aid workers’ security. While chang-
ing security dynamics makes it difficult to establish a detailed, all-
encompassing Aide Memoire, some improvements are called for. 
First, the primary means to achieve higher levels of protection for aid 
workers is to ensure they receive sufficient security training. This 
study concludes that most humanitarian agencies lack proper training 
modules for their staff before sending them to dangerous environ-
ments. There needs to be mandatory security training for newly re-
cruited national and international staff, and this should be state in the 
Aide Memoire. Such training should consist of a theoretical as well as 
a practical section where staff participate in simulation exercises. Al-
though some international humanitarian workers receive their training 
in the country in which they are to work, security preparation should 
preferably take place in expatriates’ home countries. This is in order to 
make sure they are prepared for situations that might arise in the field 
and to give them time to digest what they have learned.  
 
Second, while the Aide Memoire calls upon UN peacekeepers to pro-
vide protection for humanitarian personnel, this is made difficult be-
cause they are not perceived as neutral. Instead, UN peacekeepers 
should assist in aid agencies maintaining their independence and neu-
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trality by making the divide between military and humanitarian seg-
ments of an operation more apparent, and by providing area protection 
instead of individual protection. For instance, UN peacekeepers and 
UN humanitarian workers should utilize different cars with clearly 
distinct markings when travelling in the field. That way there will be 
no confusion as to who they are. In addition, DPKO should encourage 
military divisions not to distribute humanitarian aid, because it con-
tributes to the blurring of the lines between civil and military opera-
tions. Finally, while the Aide Memoire rightly stresses the responsibil-
ity of host governments to ensure unimpeded humanitarian access, it 
should outline more clearly the repercussions when a government de-
liberately fails to do so.  
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